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Abstract This chapter presents a preliminary analysis on how some market risk meas-
ures dramatically increased during the COVID-19 pandemic, with measures computed 
over longer horizons experiencing more pronounced effects. We provide examples when 
regulatory market risk measurement proved to be suboptimal, overestimating risk. A fur-
ther issue was the large number of Value-at-Risk ‘exceptions’ during the first few months 
of the crisis, which normally leads to overinflated bank capital requirements. The current 
regulatory framework should address these problems by suggesting improvements to 
the calculation of risk measures and/or by modifying the rules which determine capital 
requirements to make them appropriate and realistic in crisis situations.
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1 Introduction
The coronavirus pandemic has been one of the most devastating 
global crises since the Second World War. It has had far-reaching 
consequences that affected all countries to varying degrees. The 
most tragic impact has been the loss of lives, but also job losses, the 
lack of healthcare access and the effects on mental health etc. have 
been devastating. The outcome of the pandemic in the financial sec-
tor has been a financial crisis, named the COVID-19 crisis. Ramel-
li and Wagner (2020; forthcoming) compare stock performances by 
industry as early effects of the crisis, and identify the Energy sector 
as being the worst hit whilst Telecom, Pharma & Biotech reaping the 
largest gains. Acharya and Steffen (2020) highlight how stock perfor-
mance depended on liquidity as stocks with high liquidity performed 
better. Aldasoro et al. (2020) raise concerns about the long-terms 
prospects of banks, as the banking sector has been more severely 
hit than most sectors, and argue that the consequences are compa-
rable with the outcomes of the 2008 global financial crisis.
Here we investigate how financial risks increased and how the 
crisis affected financial institutions, with a focus on market risk 
measurement, and we discuss the challenges faced by regulators. 
We examine the first five months of the crisis, analysing the effects 
of equity market index risk factors, and to some extent commodity 
risk factors, as these are the risk dimensions most affected by the 
COVID-19 crisis. Other risk factors indicated serious levels of mar-
ket stress. Examples include government bond yields, which reached 
historical lows, and volatility risk factors, such as the CBOE VIX in-
dex, which had its largest shocks, both positive and negative and 
reached its highest value ever of 82.69 in March 2020, as illustrat-
ed in figure 1 [fig. 1]. At the time of writing the crisis is still affecting 
the economies worldwide as well as the day-to-day lives of millions.
2 Overview of the Market Risk Regulation Before the Crisis
Market risk refers to the risk of losses arising from adverse movements 
in market prices of assets. From a regulatory perspective, the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (1996) first introduced market risk 
capital reserves against unexpected asset price movements in the trad-
ing books of banks. Since then, Value-at-Risk (VaR) has become the 
dominating measure of market risk, which financial institutions and 
regulators use to make risk-informed decisions and to calculate mar-
ket risk capital requirements. VaR is defined as the potential loss one 
may face over a given time horizon with a pre-defined confidence level. 
For example, if the 99% 10-day VaR is $1 million, there is 99% chance 
that the losses will not exceed $1 million over the next 10 trading days.
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In the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, the flaws of mar-
ket risk regulation have become evident. For instance, the VaR-based 
risk assessment has been found to underestimate the risks in tur-
bulent markets. To address these problems, the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (2019) published revisions to its global regula-
tory standards that include a move from Value-at-Risk to Expected 
Shortfall (ES). ES measures the average loss beyond the VaR thresh-
old in the tail of the loss distribution, producing more accurate gaug-
es of tail risk. The typical confidence level is 99% for VaR and 97.5% 
for ES, corresponding to the 1% and 2.5% worst-case losses, respec-
tively. Moreover, considering the liquidity of various assets, vary-
ing time horizons are used to evaluate financial risks, i.e. 10 days 
for large cap equities, 20 days for small cap, and up to 120 days for 
some risk categories. However, the latest regulations stipulate that 
these risk calculations are based on overlapping 10-day returns and 
we discuss this procedure in our risk assessments.
Figure 2 shows the 10-day 97.5% ES1 calculated using the most 
widely accepted risk model in the industry, Historical Simulation (de-
noted by HS in the following), based on the S&P 500 index returns 
(2000-06-26/2020-06-23), and plots it along the index [fig. 2]. Within 
one week during March 2020, the index was hit by a shock of around 
-19% cumulative return. As the figure shows, during the global finan-
1 Throughout this chapter, ES is expressed in returns, of which the value is nonneg-
ative; a rolling window scheme is used to estimate ES with a window length of 250 
trading days.
Figure 1 CBOE volatility index from 2000-01-23 to 2020-06-23
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cial crisis between mid 2007 and early 2009, as well as during the 
sovereign debt crisis which peaked between 2010 and 2012, the risk 
measure, ES, peaked. The same can be seen during the crisis wrought 
by the coronavirus pandemic, with ES reaching a level comparable 
with the ES during the financial crisis, as also discussed in Capelle-
Blancard and Desroziers (2020). It is to be noticed that the ES dur-
ing the crisis increased to multiple times the level before the crisis.
Though the first cases of COVID-19 date back to December 2019, 
the lockdown in China occurred on January 23, 2020. Following this, 
the virus spread quickly over other parts of the globe and a global 
pandemic was declared by the WHO on March 11, 2020.2 On seeing 
the widespread effects of the coronavirus outbreak on the economy 
and the banks, prudential authorities as well as local jurisdictions 
decided to delay the implementation of the latest version of market 
risk regulatory framework (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
2019), called the Fundamental Review of the Trading Book (FRTB), 
until January 2023. This gives regulators time to consider suitable 
changes to market risk measurement and management in the new Ba-
sel framework, if required. It also gives financial institutions breath-
ing space to reevaluate their market risk estimation methodologies 
as well as the steps needed to be taken to reduce risk exposures to 
an acceptable level. Also, risk estimates such as VaR and ES depend 
2 More information about how this global event unfolded and a detailed timeline can 
be found in https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/27-04-2020-who-timeline-
--covid-19.
Figure 2 10-day Historical Simulation ES at 97.5%, 
based on S&P 500 index returns from 2000-06-26 to 2020-06-23
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on the modelling framework, and in the following we examine this 
dependence in more detail.
3 Market Risk Measurement Over the First Five Months  
of the Crisis
For regulatory purposes and for internal risk assessment of institu-
tions, the estimation of VaR and ES measures over a given time pe-
riod is of interest, since market risk capital calculations are based 
on risk assessments. Here we focus on the estimation of ES as it is a 
central element of the recent regulations. To illustrate the dramat-
ic increase in risk witnessed in the first half of 2020,3 figure 3 pre-
sents the level of 97.5% ES risk over 10 days, for two assets: FTSE 
100 index returns as well as Europe Brent Crude Oil Spot returns, 
based on two methods: Historical Simulation, computed using over-
lapping 10-day returns, as well as the well-known GARCH(1,1) mod-
el that assumes normally distributed returns. For the GARCH model, 
the h-day ES is calculated based on the daily ES estimates, written 
as , which is called the ‘square root of time’ 
rule [fig. 3].
Figure 3 10-day HS ES and GARCH ES at 97.5% for FTSE 100 and oil returns
The first thing to notice from figure 3 is that the general level of ES 
risk computed using HS increases dramatically during March 2020, 
by a multiplier of more than 4 for the FTSE index, and by a multipli-
er of more than 5 for the risk computed from oil returns. Also, the ES 
stays at this level until the end of the sample period, unaffected by the 
3 Similarly, Ibikunle and Rzayev (2020) show a substantial increase of a cross-section-
al average volatility for 110 European stocks from 24 Jan. to 24 March in their figure 1.
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events during this period. If these values are used for capital calcu-
lation, the required capital would also increase multiple times, with 
many financial institutions not being able to meet these increased 
capital requirements.4 To address this, banks across the world are 
allowed to temporarily suspend the new capital calculation method 
against the radically increased risk, as discussed by Borio and Restoy 
(2020). Moreover, the GARCH model does a good job in terms of the 
speed of reaction to large negative returns, but it leads to risk es-
timates increasing dramatically, by a multiplier of more than 10, as 
can be seen in figure 3 for the FTSE returns, which would give capi-
tal requirements that are impossible to meet, reaching levels of more 
than 10 times the pre-crisis levels. Followed by this initial sharp rise 
in risk, the risk level estimated by GARCH decreases back within a 
month, and in the second part of the sample period it is below the 
risk level estimated by the HS method.
For oil returns, the risk estimate obtained by GARCH displays a 
large variation. After the initial sharp rise in risk at the beginning 
of March, on April 20 the market experienced its deepest fall in the 
price of a barrel of West Texas Intermediate (WTI), the benchmark for 
US oil, even leading to negative prices for this commodity – caused by 
an abrupt drop in demand. This aroused investors’ fears and created 
a turbulent oil market, as evidenced by the predictions of GARCH ES 
of oil returns, with the ES risk reaching levels more than 15 times 
higher than the level in January 2020. This shows the high depend-
ence of GARCH risk estimates on returns; although the model is quick 
to react to events, due to the high level of risk estimates it is less suit-
able to be used for capital calculations. These risk estimates high-
light the severity of the COVID-19 financial crisis, especially after 
the coronavirus pandemic was declared in March 2020.
To illustrate the effects of the COVID-19 crisis on the global fi-
nancial markets, we consider the market indices S&P 500 (spx), FT-
SE 100 (ftse), DAX (dax), Nikkei 225 (nky), and Shanghai Composite 
(sse), as well as several commodities including Europe Brent Crude 
Oil Spot prices (oil), Henry Hub Natural Gas Spot Prices (gas), Lon-
don PM fix gold prices (gold), Copper Jul 20 futures contract (cop-
per), as well as the Sugar #11 Oct 20 futures contract (sugar), from 
January 2019 to June 2020. Figure 4 shows the multipliers for His-
torical Simulation ES, calculated as the ratio of the average ES over 
the last five trading days of the sample period, ending with June 23, 
2020, and the average ES over the first five trading days starting 
with January 23, 2020 [fig. 4]. We use three different time horizons (1 
4 More measures are taken by governments and banks to alleviate the adverse finan-
cial and economic effects of the COVID-19 crisis, as suggested by Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (2020).
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day, 10 days and 20 days) to compute the risk estimates and the mul-
tipliers. For some assets the multipliers take large values: index re-
turns and oil returns, most noticeably. For the S&P 500, FTSE, DAX 
and Nikkei 225 index returns, the increase in the risk level shows 
a similar pattern: the risk increased by 3 to 6 times, depending on 
the risk horizon. For the Shanghai Composite index, the value of the 
multiplier is less than one, showing that this index didn’t display an 
increase in the level of ES risk estimates. The gas market seems un-
affected as well in terms of risk estimates. The other commodities 
considered – gold, copper and sugar – show an increase in the risk 
level by about twofold, whilst the risk estimates obtained from oil re-
turns increased dramatically during the crisis. 
It is interesting to note the dependency of the multiplier on the 
risk horizon: for most assets considered, the multiplier for the 1-day 
risk horizon is smaller than the multiplier for the 10-day horizon, and 
the multiplier for the 20-day horizon is the largest. If the ‘square root 
of time’ rule was valid, then these multipliers should have been at 
the same level, regardless of the time horizon. However, this is not 
the case, which highlights that longer horizon risks were affected by 
the COVID-19 crisis more than short horizon risks, with some of the 
risk estimates going up sixfold over the sample period. This pattern 
is not followed by all asset classes, but it seems to be a typical be-
haviour of risk estimates for the majority of assets considered here.
Figure 4 Multipliers for HS ES at 97.5% over 1, 10 and 20 days across various assets, 
calculated as the ratio of the average ES over the last five trading days of the sample period 
divided by the average ES over the first five trading days of our sample
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4 Challenges to the Regulatory Framework
In the following we consider the current Basel framework for mar-
ket risk calculations, with a focus on the risk horizons considered 
in these assessments. As specified by the regulation, different risk 
horizons are applied to different categories of risk factors, ranging 
from 10 days for the most liquid asset classes and up to 120 days for 
some risk factor categories. Under the current framework, these cal-
culations are based on 10-day ES assessments, and then the ‘square 
root of time’ rule is used to compute risk over longer horizons, writ-
ten as The question we are asking here is 
whether this approximation was proved to be correct or not during 
the recent crisis.
Figure 5 investigates three different approaches to estimate ES of 
an individual asset,5 the FTSE 100 index, over h days: 1) in the first 
approach, the h-day ES is calculated based on the daily ES using the 
‘square root of time’ rule, so ; 2) in the second 
approach, we follow the FRTB recommendations and calculate the 
h-day ES from the 10-day ES estimates (computed from overlapping 
observations) as , hereafter referred to as 
the regulatory ES; 3) in the third approach we directly use the h-day 
overlapping observations to get h-day ES [fig. 5]. We focus on the cal-
culation of 40-day ES (h = 40) at 97.5% level, considering the above 
5 For simplicity, we illustrate the calculation of ES where only one risk factor is con-
sidered. 
Figure 5 Comparison of three approaches to compute 97.5% HS ES over 40 trading days, based on FTSE 100
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Figure 6 Time-varying number of VaR exceptions (the daily returns being 
below the negative of the daily HS VaR at 99%) over a 250 trading day backtesting period
three approaches with the estimates displayed in figure 5. It is to 
be noted that the regulatory ES (as shown using a red line) overes-
timates the actual risk (as shown by the yellow line), whilst the ap-
proach based on the simple ‘square root of time’ rule computed from 
daily ES estimates (as shown by the blue line) gives a better fit. This 
pattern, which we noticed for other asset classes and for other risk 
horizons as well, suggests that regulatory capital might overesti-
mate risk in such cases.
Whilst market risk measurement has moved from VaR to ES, back-
testing ES is a debating area and the current regulation stipulates 
VaR backtesting only. As such, the focus is on counting the number of 
daily VaR exceptions (cases when the daily return is below the nega-
tive of daily VaR estimate) over a period of 250 days. Coloured zones 
are considered, with the green zone applying if the number of excep-
tions is less than or equal with 5, amber zone when the number of ex-
ceptions is more than 10, and yellow zone in between. Different zones 
carry different levels of multipliers applied for capital calculations.
In figure 6, over a five-month period in early 2020, we show the 
total number of exceptions of HS VaR, with a backtesting period of 
250 trading days specified in the regulatory framework [fig. 6]. Nev-
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ertheless, the major indices (except for the Shanghai Composite in-
dex, sse) and oil experienced a steep increase in the number of ex-
ceptions between March and April 2020 (with the FTSE, DAX and 
oil risk estimates in the amber zone), indicating that the Historical 
Simulation method is unable to accommodate for the extreme market 
events of early 2020. This shows a weakness of the HS method, and 
raises a point that needs to be addressed by regulators and financial 
institutions, namely to improve on the current market risk models.
5 Looking Ahead
As the previous sections highlight, some of the challenges in terms of 
market risk measurement, as a result of the COVID-19 crisis, faced 
by the regulatory bodies, local jurisdictions, and financial institu-
tions can be summarised as: 
1. as a result of the increased values of risk measures, obtained 
using regulatory calculations, the level of capital require-
ments rose dramatically, which is a challenge because such 
high capital needs are very hard to meet; as such, improve-
ments should be made to the risk and capital calculations that 
would lead to more realistic capital requirements;
2. risk assessments depend on the models used; and the estimat-
ed risks can display large variations as a result of this; this 
model dependence needs to be addressed; 
3. risk estimates obtained over longer horizons seem to be af-
fected more by the crisis, as compared to risk estimates ob-
tained over shorter horizons, which is a pattern shown by the 
majority of assets considered in this study. This highlights that 
the suitability of the ‘square root of time’ rule, which is cur-
rently stipulated by the regulation, needs more investigation;
4. a typical pattern we found is that market risk calculation 
based on the current regulatory framework overestimates the 
actual risk, which leads to the question of how the currently 
stipulated risk calculations can be improved;
5. the large number of VaR breaches over the first 5 months of 
the COVID-19 crisis is worrisome; these can be addressed via 
improved risk calculations, or via improvements in the reg-
ulatory framework (e.g. the number of exceptions allowed).
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6 Conclusions
As seen above, the events of early 2020 have had devastating con-
sequences globally including serious financial outcomes. In terms of 
market risks, we found that in general the effects of the COVID-19 cri-
sis were more pronounced for longer horizons. It is vital for financial 
institutions to do their best to prepare for such events, and for regu-
lators to encourage banks to set aside enough capital for future cri-
ses. So, it is important to have an appropriate modelling framework 
that is able to quickly and appropriately respond to crisis events, 
whilst leading to realistic and suitable bank capital requirements.
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